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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
ROGER HOLFELTZ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASEN0.981193-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code, Title 78, Chapter 
2a, Section 3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the Court err in finding that even though the initial stop and detention of the 
appellant was illegal, no evidence should be suppressed? Was there sufficient evidence to 
show that the appellant received a visual or audible signal to stop his vehicle within the 
meaning of the Utah Statutes? Was there sufficient evidence to show that the appellant 
received a proper signal to stop a motor vehicle while he was a driver? Did the Court 
prevent the presentation of viable defenses when it ruled that the presentation of any ruling 
concerning an illegal stop could not be presented to the jury? Did the Court abuse its 
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discretion in denying a motion to terminate the appellant's probation? 
The various issues require different standards of review depending on the issue. With 
reference to the factual findings on the motion to suppress, the appellant does not challenge 
the Trial Court's ruling that the initial stop was illegal. The Court's legal conclusions based 
on those findings of fact are to be review on a "correctness" standard giving no particularly 
deference to the Trial Court. Similarly, the Court's conclusions in regard to whether or not 
evidence of the illegal stop could be presented to the jury is a question of law and should 
also be reviewed on a correctness standard. See State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d. 894 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1993). In reviewing a jury verdict, the court should review the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict (State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P. 2d 232 (Utah 1992), or as stated in State v. Mitchell (779 P. 2d 1116 
(1989) "A reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all the evidence, there was a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have decided the case differently" With regard to 
the sentencing issue, this court will use an "Abuse of Discretion" standard. See State v. 
Houk, 906 P.2d 907 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
This case is reflects a conviction of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a 
third degree felony in violation of Title 46, Chapter 6, Section 13.5 (1), Utah Code 
Annotated. This provision appears to be determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
rhis is an appeal of the conviction on the charge of Failure to Respond to Officer's 
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Signal to Stop, a Third degree felony, following a jury trial held before the Eighth District 
Court in and for Uintah County, the Honorable Lynn Payne presiding, on November 5,1997. 
The judgement and order of conviction were entered on March 3,1998. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 16th of February, 1997,Vernal City Officers arrested a female suspect 
for Failure to Use a Child Safety Restraint. (Trial, p. 172) Utah Highway Patrol trooper Jon 
Gardner assisted at that arrest and later returned to the scene to attempt to get information 
regarding the name of and parents of a child who was being taken into Division of Child and 
Family Service custody based on the arrest of the mother. (Trial P. 174, 177). Upon the 
return trip Trooper had some conversation with the appellant. (Trial, p. 180) The Trooper 
then detained the appellant and called for a wrecker to impound the vehicle which he 
believed belonged to the appellant, based on an assumed expired registration. (Trial, p. 
180). The appellant got into the vehicle started the car moving it into a parking lot which 
was adjacent to the area where it was previously parked. While the appellant was walking 
toward the vehicle, Trooper Gardner asked the appellant to either wait or stop. (Trial, p. 
184) When the appellant attempted to move his vehicle, Trooper Gardner ran to the moving 
vehicle, reached inside and tried to physically remove the appellant from the vehicle. The 
trooper believed he was dragged by the appellant down the road during the attempted re-
location of the vehicle. (Trial, p. 186-187) The appellant stopped the vehicle after moving 
it approximately thirty three feet into a driveway onto private property, although the Trooper 
believed it was fifty or sixty feet. (Trial, p. 189 and 375-377). The appellant was arrested 
for Attempted Murder of a Police Officer, a first degree felony; Failure to Respond to 
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Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; Expired 
Registration, a Class C Misdemeanor, and No Driver's License in Possession, a Class C 
Misdemeanor.. 
C. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The appellant appeared before the court of the 21st of February, 1997. Alan M. 
Williams was appointed as consulting counsel, the defendant wishing to represent himself at 
least in part in this matter. The State immediately filed a motion for a competency 
evaluation of the appellant. Over the appellant's objection, the court appointed two alienists 
to conduct a competency evaluation. The initial counsel for the state was Kenneth 
Wallentine, but he withdrew from representation based on the possibility of a conflict of 
interest. On April 15, 1997, Herbert Gillespie, the Duchesnes County Attorney became 
counsel of record on behalf of the Attorney General's Office. On June 24,1997, the 
appellant was found competent to proceed and Preliminary Hearing was scheduled for July 
22,1997. On that date, an amended information was filed reducing the charge of Attempted 
Murder of a Police Officer to that of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony in violation of 
Section 76-5-103. Hearing was held and the court bound the matter on the amended 
information for trial. The appellant stood mute on the arraignment. The Court entered not 
guilty pleas on behalf of the appellant. Trial was scheduled for November 5-6,1997. 
On October 17, 1997, the matter came before the court for a motions hearing. The 
appellant was representing himself on the motions and had not prepared them. Another 
hearing was held on October 23,1997, at which time the court discussed voir dire and jury 
instructions. On October 31,1997, a suppression hearing was held. The issue before the 
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court primarily involved the illegality of Trooper Gardner's initial attempt to detain the 
appellant. The Court did not make any formal ruling at that time on the issues presented. 
There was an extensive discussion wherein the court was informed that the issue of the 
court's ruling on the motion to suppress could come up at the trial. The court make it clear 
that it felt that the alleged crimes of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop and 
Aggravated Assault were independent crimes and that any ruling on the law should not be 
discussed at trial. On November 5, 1997, just before trial, the court issued its formal ruling 
and finding on the suppression issues. The court ruled that Trooper Gardner did not have 
reasonable cause to stop and detain the appellant. The court also ruled that the trooper did 
have authority to impound the vehicle he believed belonged to the appellant. The court ruled 
that no evidence was obtained by the police as a result of the illegal detention or that it was 
not related to the central charges of the case. At the conclusion of the ruling, the court, off 
the record, ordered consulting counsel not to bring up the ruling in front of the jury. 
The case was tried before a jury. The Misdemeanor charged were dismissed prior to 
the case being sent to the jury. The jury acquitted the appellant of the charge of Aggravated 
Assault, but found him guilty of the charge of Failure to Respond to Officer Signal to Stop, a 
third degree felony. Following the trial, a presentence investigation was performed by Adult 
Probation and Parole. Counsel for appellant's contract with Uintah County expired at the 
end of 1997, therefore counsel withdrew on January 2,1998. On January 6,1998, Rob 
Lunnan was appointed assisting counsel for the appellant. Mr Lunnan requested on 
February 3,1998 that Alan Williams be re-appointed to assist the appellant. He was re-
appointed for the purpose of sentencing only. Sentencing took place on March 3,1998. 
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Mr. Lunnan's appointment continued for the purpose of appeal. Subsequent to the 
entry of judgement, the appellant asked Mr. Lunnan to file an appeal in this matter. Mr. 
Lunnan declined, citing his contract with the county as paying him only for those appeals he 
felt were meritorious. The appellant therefore filed this appeal pro se. Mr. Lunnan 
abandoned his contract with Uintah County in about August 1998. Cindy Barton-Coombs 
assumed duties as public defender, but the appellant requested that Mr. Williams be re-
appointed for the purposes of appeal. Hearing was held on October 14, 1998, re-appointing 
Mr. Williams as consulting assisting counsel for the appellant. 
Pursuant to the appeal filed by the appellant, the matter was transferred to this court. 
The matter was returned again to the Eight District Court on February 22,1999 for hearing 
on a motion to supplement the record. The court ruled on March 31,1999, that the record 
should be supplemented by adding the substance of the off the record conversation on 
November 5,1997 wherein both counsel were ordered not to bring up the court's ruling on 
the motion to suppress. On April 13,1999, the court finalized its order concerning the 
supplementation of the record. In the meantime, Adult Probation had filed a motion to 
terminate the appellant's probation. The court denied that motion as well on April 13,1999, 
adding that it would not grant any motion for early termination of probation filed by the 
appellant. The case was later returned to this court on or near February 11,2000. 
The matter again came before the Eight District Court on February 29,2000 on an 
Adult Probation and Parole motion to terminate probation. The court informed the 
defendant that he expected to deny the motion again, however the hearing was continued. 
The appellant filed a Notice and Demand for Judicial Recusal for Disability on March 21, 
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2000 alleging in part that Judge A. Lynn Payne should recuse himself from consideration 
based on his February 29, 2000 comment that he was going to deny the termination before he 
heard anything from the appellant. The Recusal was referred to Judge Lyle Anderson who 
denied it on May 19, 2000. The matter of probation termination came before the court again 
on August I, 2000. Judge Payne took no evidence and ruled that the appellant "had not 
made satisfactory progress in his duty to the W a n d therefore denied early termination. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court wrongfully ruled that no evidence should be suppressed as a result of 
the illegal stop and detention of the appellant. The Trial Court also wrongfully ruled that 
there was sufficient reason for Trooper Gardner to impound the vehicle. The evidence of 
any command to stop was a fruit of the illegal detention and therefore should have been 
suppressed. The Court additionally ruled and ordered that the fact that the initial detention 
was illegal could not be brought before the jury. As a result, the Trial Court effectively ruled 
that the appellant could be convicted for failing to respond to an illegal order to stop. 
The evidence was inadequate to show that the appellant received a visual or audible 
signal to stop as outlined in the Utah Statutes. The appellant was not given a proper signal to 
stop while he was the operator of a vehicle. The Court wrongfully denied Adult Probation 
and Parole's motion to terminate probation making factual findings without holding any 
hearing. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE 
POLICE AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGAL STOP BY THE TROOPER. 
The Trial Judge issued its formal ruling regarding the motion to suppress evidence on 
the morning of November 5, 1997 just prior to the beginning of trial in this matter. The 
factual basis for the suppression was taken from the court's adoption of the Preliminary 
Hearing transcript and further evidence presented on October 31,1997. The court found that 
Trooper Jon Gardner had no reasonable articulable suspicion that the appellant had 
committed any crime. (Ruling prior to Trial, Transcript p. 19 and 21) The appellant was in 
the vicinity of someone who had previously arrested and the Trooper felt that the appellant 
was not coooperative in giving information concerning the identity of a child who was being 
taken into State's custody based on her mother's arrest. The appellant was also in the general 
proximity of a vehicle which the trooper could see had a Washington license plate. (PH 
Transcript, p. 25) The license plate had a sticker indicating either "Aug" or "8" of "96". 
With no evidence, the Trooper detained the appellant on suspicion of the crime of Driving 
With an Expired Registration. The Trooper did not check with dispatch to see if the license 
plate was actually expired, but assumed that under Washington law, the stickers indicated an 
expiration date rather than an issue date for the plate. (Oct 31 hearing, P. 30-31) Trooper 
Gardner then approached the appellant and detained him for the purpose of investigating the 
supposed violation. 
The Trial Court correctly ruled that the stop of the appellant was illegal. It 
incorrectly ruled that the impound of the vehicle was legal. Section 41-la-l 101, Utah Code 
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Annotated outlines the prerequisities for a vehicle to be impounded. It states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) The division of any peace officer, without a warrant may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe had been stolen; 
(b) On which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or 
obliterated; 
(c) That has been abandoned on the public highways; 
(d) For which the applicant has written a check for registration or title fees 
that has not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paif with 
thirty days; 
(e) That is placed on the water with improper registration; 
(f) That is being operated on a highway: 
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three months; 
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner; 
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked. 
Subsections (a) through (e) have no relevance to this case. The only basis for the impound 
would be under subsection (f), that is that the vehicle was being operated on a highway. 
There is no evidence that the vehicle was being operated at the time Trooper Gardner 
decided to impound the vehicle. He stated that he pulled up behind the Subaru which was 
parked (Trial, p. 178) He saw a Washington registration sticker that said either AUG or 8, 
96. He knew nothing of Washington law. He did not know whether the sticker referred to 
the date of expiration or issue under Washington law. He did not radio dispatch to find out 
any expiration date. (October 31, p. 30-31). 
The Court attached no significance to its own ruling concerning the illegal stop. 
The Court believed that evidence gathered subsequent to the officer's illegal action was not a 
result of the illegality. (Trial transcript, p. 24) This is ludicrous. The very act upon which 
this whole trial was based, was the request by Trooper Gardner that the appellant should 
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"stop or wait" while the appellant was walking toward the vehicle which he intended to 
impound. No other evidence of any visual or audible signal to stop was presented to the 
Court. As the Trial Court ruled, "Up to the time that Mr. Holfeltz started to walk towards 
the vehicle, Mr. Gardner had not observed any violations of the law with respect to Mr. 
Holfeltz. Nothing that he gathered was relevant or incriminating as to an element of this 
crime." (Trial transcript, p. 21). The Trooper had no legal authority to make such a stop. 
His belief that he had any authority to make a stop was based solely on his illegal conduct. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Wong Sun V. U.S. (371 U.S. 471)nearly 
forty years ago wherein the doctrine usually called "fruits of the poisonous tree" was 
established. This court as recently as the last month or so decided the case of State vs. 
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, followed that doctrine in setting forth the test. In deciding 
whether or not evidence should be excluded, the test is whether the evidence has been come 
at by exploitation of the illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint. Here, evidence of the verbage alleged as the signal to stop were the direct 
result of the illegal detention, and indeed furthered the illegal stop. It was in immediate 
proximity in time to the illegality. It thus should have been excluded. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE ARRESTING 
OFFICER GAVE A VISUAL OR AUDIBLE SIGNAL TO STOP 
Section 41-6-13.5, Utah Code Annotated, provides that "An operator who, having 
received a visual or audible signal from a peace office to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates 
his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
11 
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree." The appellant was convicted 
under this statute. No place in the statute itself defines a "visual or audible signal to stop." 
The next section, Section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, however refers to the privileges 
allowed to an emergency vehicle. It specifically grants the privileges of pursuit only to those 
vehicles when the operator of the emergency vehicle in pursuit "sounds both an audible 
signal under Section 41-6-146, and uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, 
which is visible from in front of the vehicle, " Section 41-6-14(4)(a) Utah Code Annotated. 
Those sections in turn define both visual and audible signals. 
Section 41-6-132, Utah Code Annotated provides that: 
(a) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other equipment 
required by this chapter, be equipped with signal lamps mounted as high and as widely 
spaced laterally as is practicable, which shall be capable of display to the front two 
alternately flashing red lights located at the same level and to the rear two alternating 
flashing red lights located at the same level, and these lights shall have sufficient intensity to 
be visible at 500 feet in normal sunlight. 
(b) A police vehicle when used as an authorized emergency vehicle may but need not 
be equipped with alternately flashing lights specified herein. 
(c ) In addition to the alternately flashing lighting described in Subsection (a), any 
authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a lighting device displaying rotating 
beams of red light, of red and white light, or red and blue light. 
Section 41-6-146(d) Utah Code Annotated provides that: 
Every authorized emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell, 
capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than 
500 feet and of a type approved by the department, but such siren shall not be used except 
when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit 
of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the driver of such 
vehicle shall sound said siren when reasonably necessary to warn pedestrians and other 
drivers of the approach thereof. 
In this case, the only signal to stop which Trooper Gardiner claims he gave to the 
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appellant to stop was verbal, that is, an order to "stop or waif when the appellant was 
walking to the vehicle. (Trial p. 184) No lights or siren were used until after the vehicle had 
come to a complete stop. (Trial, p. 230) The Prosecutor argued to the jury that Trooper 
Gardiner's grabbing of the appellant and trying to pull him from a moving vehicle 
constituted a visual or audible signal to stop. That likewise does not constitute a sign to stop 
under the statute. The rights that a peace officer may have and the duties that the operator of 
a vehicle are dependent on the defined visual or audible signal expressed by the legislature in 
the above sections. No such visual or audible signal was given. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS THE 
OPERATOR OF A VEHICLE WHEN THE VERBAL SIGNAL TO STOP WAS GIVEN. 
41-6-13.5 Utah Code Annoted provides in part that "An operator who, having 
received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to stop, operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard... 
Trooper Gardner made no claim to have given any signal to the appellant to stop except his 
verbal warning or command to stop while the appellant was walking towards the motor 
vehicle which he moved to a private parking lot. A fair reading of the statute is that the 
alleged wrongdoer must be an operator, that is be in operation of a vehicle when he receives 
a proper signal from a peace officer to stop in order for this crime to attach. This is further 
reinforced by a reading of the statute just prior to section 13.5. 
Section 41-6-13(a), Utah Code Annotated, provides that" A person may not willfully 
fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace officer, fireman, 
flagger at a highway construction or maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing 
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guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. That offense is a 
Class B Misdemeanor rather than the third degree felony which was charged in this case. 
Section 13(a) specifically refers to those cases where a person has a duty to comply with 
orders or directions of peace officers regardless of their status as operators, pedestrians, or 
spectators. The jury instruction, (No. 17) which explained the elements of the offense stated 
that proof of the commision of the offense of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop 
required proof of each of the following elements: 
1. That on or about the 16th day of February, 1997: 
2. The defendant, Roger Lee Hoifeltz, was an operator of a motor vehicle: 
3. That the defendant received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to 
bring his vehicle to a stop; 
4. That the defendant either; 
a. Operated his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard. .. 
In other words, the jury was instructed that the state needed to prove that the appellant was 
an operator, but not that he received a signal while he was an operator. The instruction was 
given incorrectly allowing the jury to believe that the offense could occur if the signal was 
given at some other time than when the appellant was operating a vehicle. 
The jury instruction was objected to. (October 17, p. 58) The state may claim that 
the objection lodged by the appellant was too broad. That does not alter, however, the fact 
that the evidence when properly applied to the law, did not provide a basis for an offense. 
An improper jury instruction, even when not objected to may be considered when it is 
necessary to avoid manifest injustice, State v. Blubaugh. 904 P. 2d 688 (Ut.Ct. App. 1995). 
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A failure to properly instruct a jury as the required elements of the offense charged mandates 
reversal. See U.S. v. Davis. 965 F.2d 804 (10th Circ, 1992) The evidence is insufficient to 
show that the appellant received a signal while an operator of a motor vehicle. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO MENTION COULD BE MADE 
OF ITS DECISION THAT THE INITIAL STOP AND DETENTION OF THE APPELLANT 
WAS ILLEGAL. 
Both the discussions at the conclusion of the suppression hearing on October 31, 
1997 and the orders made by the Trial Court in its ruling concerning the motions to suppress 
prevented even the mention to the jury by the appellant that the Court had ruled the detention 
by Trooper Gardner to be illegal. (Supplement to Record, June 2,1999) This ruling had 
several ramifications preventing the appellant from presenting several potential defenses. 
The appellant could not present a defense of mistake of law, that is the appellant could not 
present his belief that he was entitled to resist an illegal arrest pursuant to the decision 
reached by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bradshaw. 541 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1975). See 
also the cases cited in the dissent of State v. Gardiner, infra. It prevented presentation of any 
defense on the basis that the attempted stop of the appellant was illegal. It prevented any 
defense on the basis that the peace officer was not acting within the scope of his duty. It 
prevented any defense on the basis that an individual may have a common law right to flee 
an illegal arrest. It prevented presentation of any defense involving defense of personal 
property from illegal seizure. 
Much of the Trial Court's decision revolved around the case of State v. Gardiner, 814 
P. 2d 568, (Utah 1991). The Trial judge in this case was also the trial judge in Gardiner, 
therefore his discussion of the Gardiner issues and any challenge to it was particularly 
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heated. An examination of the Gardiner case is particularly appropriate in evaluating this 
case. In Gardiner, the court ruled that based on the statute proscribing assault on a peace 
officer, the common law right to resist an illegal arrest outlined in dicta in Bradshaw no 
longer existed. That decision was based on several factors. Firstly, a defendant has no need 
to resist an illegal search because he has the assurance that any evidence acquired by an 
illegal search will be ruled inadmissible in a subsequent trial, citing United States ex rel. 
KilheffervPlowfieki 409 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa., 1976). The Trial Court however, used 
Gardiner as its justification in part not to suppress evidence. The appellant was denied his 
remedy, that is no evidence was suppressed. Secondly, the statute in question in Gardiner 
(76-5-102.4, Utah Code Annotated) required that an officer must have been acting within the 
scope of his authority. No such requirement is included in the Failure to Respond statute in 
this case.. The Gardiner court discussed how that in Bradshaw, a similar statute which 
allowed arrested individuals no right to resist an arrest regardless of the legality was ruled 
void for vagueness. The issue of the legality of the statute allowing an officer unfettered 
protection for illegal arrests was not reached on that basis. Nevertheless, by fair implication, 
if the actions of Trooper Gardiner are to have any force of law, there must be at least the 
limits outlined in the current "Assault on a Peace Officer" statute, that is, Trooper Gardner 
must have been acting to some degree within the scope of his authority. The Gardiner court 
discussed the case of United States v. Heliczer. 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967) wherein it 
adopted the test of "Whether an officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is 
engaged in a personal frolic of his or her own" in determining the scope of authority issue. 
Thirdly, the Gardiner court brushed by the issue presented by Section 76-2-406, that is, a 
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person's right to use force in defense of property, essentially ruling that no one can defend 
personal property against a police officer. In this case, the appellant specifically moved the 
motor vehicle in attempt to avoid what he believed to be an illegal seizure, a seizure which 
he believed could not take place on private property. (Trial, p. 384) 
The Trial Court felt that the Gardiner decision was dispositive of the issues regarding 
the presentation of evidence concerning the illegal stop. At first glance, this case was very 
similar because the appellant was charged with aggravated assault. The appellant was 
acquitted on that charge however. This Court is bound by the acquittal and cannot consider 
the assault as a factor in whether or not the jury could even hear of the Trial Court's ruling 
that the stop was initially illegal. As it relates to the Failure to Respond charge, however, the 
appellant was precluded from presenting legitimate defenses. Section 76-2-406, Utah Code 
Annotated provides that "a person is justified in using force other than deadly force, against 
another when and to the extent that he reasonable believed that force is necessary to prevent 
or terminal criminal interference with real or personal property." The language of the statute 
is unequivocal. A person could reasonable rely on the language of that statute, even though 
the interpretation might be erroneous. Section 76-2-304(2) Utah Code Annotated provides 
that: 
Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a 
crime unless: (a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonable believed his conduct 
did not constitute an offense, and (b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: (I) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or 
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question; or (ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in a 
Court of Record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question. 
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The appellant specifically presented jury instructions to the Trial Court regarding his 
belief that resistance and or flight from an illegal detention is legal The Court rejected the 
instructions. The Court did not even allow the mention that an illegal stop had occurred. 
Therefore the court denied even the possibility of a defense on the grounds of mistake of 
law. 
The Trial Court while not explicitly so stating, in effect ruled that either the officer 
was acting withing the scope of his authority or that he did not need to be acting within the 
scope of his authority. Presumably a peace officer is employed to make legal arrests. 
Making illegal stops when there is not even reasonable articulable suspicion ( a very low 
standard) that an individual has committed a crime could constitute a frolic. By not even 
allowing discussion of the illegal stop, the court prevented even the presentation of the 
"scope of authority" issue. 
The Gardiner decision does not directly address the issue of when a peace officer 
uses excessive force in effecting an arrest, but leaves open the possibility that were an officer 
to use excessive force in an arrest, there still could be some right to resist an illegal arrest. 
Section 76-2-404, Utah Code Annotated, outlines those situations wherein a peace officer 
may use deadly force. Arguably, the attempt to pull a suspect from a moving vehicle could 
constitute deadly force. Such is exactly what Trooper Gardner tried to do to the appellant. If 
a peace officer used deadly force illegally, presumably that would constitute excessive force, 
the kind of force that a person could legally resist. Asking a person to die or submit to 
substantial risk of death from a peace officer acting illegally gives a suspect none of the 
protections that the Gardiner Court believes an illegally arrested person may have. Again, 
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the order from the Trial Court's that the illegal stop could not be presented to the jury 
precluded any possible review of the degree of force used by Trooper Gardiner. The 
appellant could not present that issue in his defense. 
The cumulative effect of the order thus prevented the presentation of defenses which 
could have been asserted by the appellant. Because evidence of the court's ruling could not 
be presented, appellant is now placed in the position of having a less than perfect record 
upon which this Court could evaluate the probability of success in using those defenses. The 
appellant's rights were thus double prejudiced, in that he could not present defenses at trial, 
and he could not make a complete record for this court. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE'S 
MOTION TO TERMINATE PROBATION, BY MAKING FINDINGS WITHOUT ANY 
EVIDENCE OR HEARING. 
On August 1, 2000, the Trial Court denied the Motion to Terminate Probation filed 
by Adult Probation and Parole. There was no evidence taken, however the Trial Judge 
commented that he found that the appellant had not learned his duty to the law as a result of 
his probation and that he was not remorseful in any way. The standard of review of the 
sentencing decision of a court are outlined in State v. Houle 906 P. 2d 907, (Ut. Ct. App. 
1995), wherein the abuse of discretion standard is mandated. In State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d, 
1234, (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court found that when a court fails to consider all 
legally relevant factors or when then sentence imposed is clearly excessive, an abuse of 
discretion has taken place. In this case, no relevant factors were considered. The Court 
simply decided that the appellant was not ready for termination. The Trial Court clearly 
abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the record in this reveals a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Many of 
the decisions reached by the Trial Court seem to be based on an inclusive reading and 
interpretation of the Gardiner case. The rulings are based almost entirely on the supposition 
that an assault took place. It did not. Thejury so found. When coupled with the inadequate 
evidence concerning both the manner and the timing of the so-called visual or audible signal 
to stop, this court must reverse the conviction reached by thejury in this case. 
Dated this day of De^ , 2000. 
Roger Holfeltz, Attorney Pro Se 
Alan M. Williams 
Consulting Counsel for Appellant 
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MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 41-la-1101 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-79, enacted by L. (L 1935, ch 46, § 78, C 1943, 57-3a-79, L 
1979, ch. 150, $ 18; 1989, ch. 274, § 17; re- 1963, ch 66, § 10) relating to sale of vehicle to 
numbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 133; 1992, ch. be dismantled and permit, and enacted another 
234, ^ 9; 1993, ch. 210, k 2. § 41-1-79, renumbered in 1992 as § 4I-la-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1011. 
1979, ch 150, § 18 repealed former § 41-1-79 
41-la-1012. Destruction or change of vessel or outboard 
motor — Cancellation of certificate of title. 
Within 15 days after a vessel or outboard motor is scrapped, dismantled, 
destroyed, or changed so that it loses its character as a vessel or outboard 
motor, the title holder to the vessel or outboard motor shall mail or deliver the 
certificate of title to the division for cancellation. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-160, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 351, § 1; renumbered by L. 1992, 
ch. 1, § 134. 
PART 11 
IMPOUNDED VEHICLES, VESSELS, OR OUTBOARD 
MOTORS 
41-la-1101. Steizure — Circumstances where permitted — 
Impound lot standards. 
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been 
stolen; 
(b) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or 
obliterated; 
(c) that has been abandoned on the public highways; 
(d) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title 
fees that has not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid 
within 30 days; 
(e) that is placed on the water with improper registration; or 
(f) that is being operated on a highway: 
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three 
months; 
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner; or 
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked. 
(2) If necessary for'the transportation of a seized vessel, the vessel's trailer 
may be seized to transport and store the vessel. 
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor under this section shall immediately notify the division of the 
action. 
(4) A vehicle or vessel seized under this section shall be moved by a peace 
officer or by a tow truck that meets the standards established: 
(a) by the Department of Public Safety under Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b); 
and 
(b) under Title 72, Chapter 9, Motor Carrier Safety Act. 
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COLLATERAL R£7F£:R£:.\ t y£i< 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1 to 8, 
and Highway Traffic § 1 et seq. 16. 
41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalties. 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, 
unless otherwise provided. 
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2,11,15, and 17 of this chapter is 
an infraction, unless otherwise provided. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 3; C. 1943, tions, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-205, 76-3-301. 
57-7-80; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
§ 4; 1991, ch. 241, § 67; 1993, ch. 60, § 1. 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for infrac-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Purpose of Motor Vehicle Code. of this act is presumed to intend the natural 
The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code is to consequences of his violation. Greaves v. State, 
govern the safety of the use and operation of 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974). 
motor vehicles, and one who violates provisions 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic con-
trollers — Speeding in construction zones. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order 
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law 
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are direct-
ing traffic, they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the standards 
adopted under Section 41-6-20. 
(3) (a) A vehicle operator who commits a speeding violation in a highway 
construction or maintenance site where workers are present shall have a 
fine imposed by the court that is at least double the fine in the uniform 
recommended fine schedule established under Section 76-3-301.5 for the 
offense. 
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(b) The highway construction or maintenance site under Subsection 
(3)(a) shall be clearly marked and have signs posted that warn of the 
doubled fine. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943, dards adopted under Section 41-6-20" for "lat-
57-7-81; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 5; 1998, ch. 317, est edition of the 'Manual on Uniform Traffic 
§ 1. Control Devices for Streets and Highways'" at 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- the end of Subsection (2), and added Subsection 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "stan- (3) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS the traffic light changed against her and she 
stopped m the safety zone, giving the other 
Obedience to traffic officer.
 t r a f f i c t h e nght-of-way, and that the overhang 
Cited. of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner in 
Obedience to traffic officer response to traffic officers express direction. 
uoeaience to tramc omcer.
 M u y h L . & ^ c % y ^ 
Pedestrian was denied recovery for injuries
 p , * 
sustained when she was struck by overhang of ' 
motorbus where from the evidence it appeared Cited in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 
that when she was half-way across the street 981 (Utah 1987) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. ation during stop for traffic infraction, 26 
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for false person- A.L.R.5th 378. 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop — 
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily 
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfei-
ture of vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace 
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any 
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, as part of 
any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death 
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting 
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. The 
court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not 
less than $5,000> 
(3) (a) In addition to tne penalty provided under this section or any other 
section, an operator Who, having received a visual or audible signal from 
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace 
officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license revoked 
pursuant to Subsection 53-3-220(1 XaXix) for a period of one year. 
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward 
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the 
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court 
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the 
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mirror, or occupant of another vehicle in use. This section does not apply to 
spot lamps on authorized emergency vehicles. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-131, enacted by L. as last amended by L 1957, ch 78, § 8, relating 
1979, ch. 242, ^ 36. to spot and fog lamps, and enacted present 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws § 41-6-131 
1979, ch 242, ^ 36 repealed former ^ 41-6-131, 
41-6-132. Emergency vehicles — Flashing lights — Rotat-
ing lights. 
(a) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other 
equipment required by this chapter, be equipped with signal lamps mounted as 
high and as widely spaced laterally as practicable, which shall be capable of 
displaying to the front two alternately flashing red lights located at the same 
level and to the rear two alternately flashing red lights located at the same 
level, and these lights shall have sufficient intensity to be visible at 500 feet in 
normal sunlight. 
(b) A police vehicle when used as an authorized emergency vehicle may but 
need not be equipped with alternately flashing red lights specified herein. 
(c) In addition to the alternately flashing lighting described in Subsection 
(a), any authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with a lighting device 
displaying rotating beams of red light, of red and white light or red and blue 
light. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-132, enacted by L. as last amended by L 1957, ch 78, § 9, relating 
1979, ch. 242, *} 37. to turn signal lights, and enacted present § 41-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 6-132 
1979, ch 242,^ 37 repealed former * 41-6-132, 
41-6-133. Warning lamps. 
(a) Any vehicle may be equipped with lamps for the purpose of warning the 
operators of other vehicles of the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard 
requiring the exercise of unusual care in approaching, overtaking or passing. 
(b) After July 1, 1979, every bus, truck, truck-tractor, trailer, semitrailer or 
pole trailer 80 inches or more in over-all width or 30 feet or more in over-all 
length shall be equipped with lamps meeting the requirements of this section. 
(c) Lamps allowed by this section shall comply with regulations issued by 
the department. 
History: C. 19^3, 41-6-133, enacted by L. as last amended by L. 1955, ch 71, § 1, relating 
1979, ch. 242, <} 38. to side cowl, fender, running board, back-up 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws lamps, and warning lamps, and enacted 
1979. ch 242.*} 38 repealed former § 41-6-133, present § 41-6-133 
41-6-133.5. Back-up lamps — Side marker lamps. 
(a) Any motor vehicle may be equipped with one or more back-up lamps 
either separately or in combination with other lamps, but any such back-up 
lamp or lamps shall not be lighted when the motor vehicle is in forward motion. 
(b) Any vehicle may be equipped with one or more side marker lamps and 
any such lamp may be flashed in conjunction with turn or vehicular hazard 
warning signals. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-14 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.7, enacted by L. merit, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote the mtro-
1993, ch. 71, *% 2; 1996, ch. 198, *> 22. ductory paragraph of Subsection (6)1 a) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Policy regarding vehicle 
pursuits — Applicability of traffic law to high-
way work vehicles — Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an 
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the 
law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsections (2) through 
(4). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in 
specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a vehicle pursuit, apply only when 
the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or 
uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in 
front of the vehicle. 
(4) Pnvileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle pursuit apply only when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds both an audible signal under 
Section 41-6-146 and uses a visual signal as defined under Section 
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle; 
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the vehicle has, in 
effect, a written policy which describes the manner and circumstances in 
which any vehicle pursuit should be conducted and terminated; 
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in accordance with the 
written policy described in Subsection (4)(b); and 
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conformance with 
standards established by the Department of Public Safety, Division of 
Peace Officer Standards and Training, which shall adopt minimum 
4 standards that shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies 
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit 
vehicles'. 
(5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5,41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter does not 
apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged 
in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the entire chapter applies to 
those persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L. 1955, ch 71, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-14, 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1965, ch. Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to apphca-
83, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 4; 1987, ch. 138, § 7; bility and exemptions from act of certain dnv-
1993, ch. 71, § 3. ers, and enacted present § 41-6-14. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
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41 -6- 1 46 MOTOR VEHICLES 
History: C. 1953,41-6-145.5, enacted by L 
1996, ch. 251, § 1; 1997, ch. 101, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection (1) 
added "the owner or lessee of a motor vehicle"; 
in Subsection (2) substituted "Except as pro-
vided under Subsection (3)" for "In the course of 
repairing a motor vehicle" and made a stylistic 
' 1:1 6 1 16 i lorii» 
hides . 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
change; and added Subsection (3), redesignat 
ing former Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 25! 
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Emergency ve-
(a) Every motor vehicle when operated upon a highway shall be equipiu-d 
with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound audible under 
normal conditions from a distance of not less than 200 feet, but no horn or 
other warning device shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or a 
whistle. The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to 
insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn but shall not 
otherwise use such horn when upon a highway. 
(b) No vehicle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a 
vehicle any siren, whistle or bell, except as otherwise permitted in this section 
(c) Any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so 
arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal. 
Such a theft alarm signal device may use a whistle, bell, horn or other audible 
signal but shall not use a siren. 
(d) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a'siren, 
whistle or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal conditions 
from a distance of not less than 500 feet and of a type approved by the 
department, but such siren shall not be used except when such vehicle is 
operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an 
actual or suspected violator of the law, in which said latter events the driver of 
such vehicle shall sound said siren when reasonably necessary to warn 
pedestrians and other drivers of the approach thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-146, enacted by L 
1979, ch. 242, § 54. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1979, ch. 242, § 54 repealed former § 41-6-146, 
as last amended by L. 1975, ch. 207, § 56, 
relating to horns and warning devices, and 
enacted present § 41-6-146, 
NMTK*, 'm nnnsioNS 
Duty to sound horn. 
In action for alleged wrongful death of 
eleven-year-old boy resulting from collision be-
tween defendant's automobile and bicycle, in-
struction that driver of vehicle intending to 
pass another vehicle, does not, under all cir-
cumstances, owe duty of sounding horn, but 
sounding of horn is left to judgment of operator 
in exercise of due care, conformed with this 
section, and was not erroneous. Manning v. 
Powers, 117 Utah 310, 215 P.2d 396 (1950). 
In action for wrongful death of eleven-year-
old boy, two instructions, one conforming with 
this section, to the effect that driver of vehicle 
intending to pass another vehicle does not, 
under all circumstances, owe duty of sounding 
horn, but sounding of horn is left to judgment of 
operator in exercise of due care, the other based 
on § 41-6-55, were not inconsistent, where in-
structions dealt with different fact situations. 
Manning v. Powers, 117 Utah 310,215 R2d 396 
(1950). 
This section does not place a duty upon a 
driver to sound his horn in any particular 
traffic situation, but instead requires due care 
in the exercise of judgment as to whether such 
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VI 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-304 
The mere existence of a personal relationship 
does not establish entrapment. Entrapment 
requires some exploitation of the personal rela-
tionship. State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993). 
Although the state, through an undercover 
officer, exploited a close personal relationship 
with defendant, there was no nexus between 
the personal relationship and defendant's offer 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — If the 
Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is the 
Next Target?—An Examination of the Entrap-
ment Theory, 19 J. Contemp. L. 217 (1993). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§ 244 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 58. 
AJL.R. — Larceny: entrapment or consent, 
10A.L.R.3dll21. 
False arrest or imprisonment: entrapment as 
precluding justification of arrest or imprison-
ment, 15 A.L.R.3d 963. * 
Defense of entrapment in contempt proceed-
ings, 41 A.L,R.3d 418. 
Admissibility of evidence of other offenses in 
rebuttal of defense of entrapment, 61 A.L.R.3d 
293. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-304; 1974, ch. 32, § 5. 
of cocaine. State v. LeVasseur, 854 R2d 1022 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). 
There was no nexus between parties' per-
sonal relationship and defendant's actions in 
approaching undercover officer and inquiring 
whether she could help him procure a pound of 
marijuana. State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
Entrapment as a defense in proceedings to 
revoke or suspend license to practice law or 
medicine, 61 A.L.R.3d 357. 
Modern status of the law concerning entrap-
ment to commit narcotics offense — state cases, 
62 A.L.R 3d 110. 
Burden of proof as to entrapment defense — 
state cases, 52 A.L.R.4th 775. 
Entrapment as defense to charge of selling or 
supplying narcotics where government agents 
supplied narcotics to defendant and purchased 
them from him, 9 AX.R.5th 464. 
Right of criminal defendant to raise entrap-
ment defense based on having dealt with other 
party who was entrapped, 15 A.L.R.5th 39. 
Actions by state official involving defendant 
as constituting "outrageous" conduct violating 
due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1. 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law 
is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable 
reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or 
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a 
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a 
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he 
believed. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Am. Jur . 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Homicide: modern status of rules as to bur-
Battery §§ 63, 69 to 80; 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homi- den and quantum of proof to show self-defense, 
cide§ 139. 43 A.L.R.3d 221. 
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery Standard for determination of reasonable-
§§ 87-93; 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 113 et seq.
 n e s s of criminal defendant's belief, for purposes 
AX.R. — Admissibility of evidence as to
 0f self-defense claim, that physical force is 
other's character or reputation for turbulence
 necessary — modern cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 993. 
on question of self-defense by one charged with ineffective assistance of counsel: battered 
assault or homicide lA.LR.3d 571.
 g e s y n d r o m e ^ d e f e n s e to homicide or 
Relationship with assailants wife as provo-
 Q t h e r c r i m i n a l o f f u A X . R . 5 t h 8 7 L 
cation depriving defendant of right of self-
 A , . .,.,.. r . , ~ , .. , , . , , 
defense, 9 A.L.R 3d 933. AdimssiMrty of eyidmce of battered child 
Homicide: duty to retreat where assailant ^ d r o m e o n l s s u e <>f self-defense, 22 A.L.R.5th 
and assailed share the same living quarters, 26 
A L.R.3d 1296 Admissibility of threats to defendant made 
Homicide: duty to retreat as condition of by third-parties to support claim of self-defense 
self-defense when one is attacked at his office, m criminal prosecution for assault or homicide, 
or place of business or employment, 41 A.L.R.3d 55 A.L.R.5th 449. 
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76-2-4uc arce in art c* (, 
Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which he 
reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or 
another fropa bodily harm while making an arrest. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-403, enacted by 1*. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-403. 
NUTESTO nmsioNK 
Deadly force. defendant had made a lawful citizen's arrest 
In finding defendant guilty of aggravated and any error in refusing to instruct the jury on 
assault, the jury necessarily concluded that citizen's arrest was harmless. State v. Quada, 
defendant had used deadly force; accordingly, 918 R2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 
the jury could not properly have found that 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — Burden of proof in civil action for 
using unreasonable force in making arrest as to 
reasonableness of force used, 82 A.L.R.4th 598. 
76-2-404. Peace officer'&> umt uf deadly force. 
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid and 
assistance, i s justified in using deadly force when: 
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in accordance with the 
judgment of a competent court in executing a penalty of death; 
(b.) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody following 
an arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is 
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by escape; and 
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has 
committed a felony offense involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of death or serious bodily injury; or 
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(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a 
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others if 
apprehension is delayed; 
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another 
person. 
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior to any 
use of deadly force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(cX 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-404, enacted by L. relating to the use of deadly force by a peace 
1986, ch. 94, ^ 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 153. officer, and enacted the present section, effec-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws . tive April 28,1986. 
1986, ch. 94, § 1 repealed former § 76-2-404, Cross-References, — Arrest, Title 77, 
as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-404, Chapter 7. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Singer v. Wadman: C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 104. 
Lawful Use of Force?, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 365. 
Am. Jur. 2d, — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide 
§ 134. 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; 
however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal 
violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the 
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is 
presumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted 
reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or 
attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or 
surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-405, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405; 1985, ch. 252, § 1. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AN MAMS 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Habitation. 
Legislative intent. 
Presumption that action reasonable. 
Unlawful and forcible entry. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of as-
sault by a prisoner, implicitly rejecting statu-
tory defenses of self-defense and defense of 
habitation, was supported by the evidence. 
State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Habitation. 
Defendant in murder prosecution, who killed 
decedent after the latter refused to leave defen-
dant's sister's house, was entitled to raise this 
section as a defense, notwithstanding the fact 
that the sister's house was not defendant's own. 
The rule of this section is a codification of the 
common-law principle that aa man's home is his 
castle,".from which he may exclude intruders 
by use of reasonable force, and its aim is to 
preserve the peace and good order of society; 
therefore, it is to be broadly construed, and 
applies not only to acts in defense of a person's 
actual residence, but any place he may be 
peacefully occupying as a home or habitation, 
including a hotel or motel room, or the home of 
another in which he is a guest. State v. 
Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant's appearances at his estranged 
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him 
no proprietary right or justification to consider 
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation," 
and his aggravated assault on his wife's over-
night male companion was therefore not justi-
fied by this section. State v. McKenna. 728 P.2d 
984 (Utah 1986). 
Legislative intent. 
The legislature intended to exclude actions of 
peace officers in the course of their duties from 
the category of intrusions that may be lawfully 
resisted. State v. Gardiner, 814 R2d 568 (Utah 
1991). 
Presumption that action reasonable. 
Since the addition of Subsection (2) by the 
1985 amendment, a defendant need only show 
that he was defending his habitation against 
unlawful entry or attempted entry and, if he 
used deadly force, that the unlawful entry was 
violent, tumultuous, surreptitious, in stealth, 
or for the purpose of committing a felony. If the 
evidence establishing these facts is believed, 
defendant's relevant actions and behefs will be 
presumed reasonable and the state must rebut 
the presumption to invalidate the defense. 
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Unlawful and forcible entry. 
A finding as to whether the entry was unlaw-
ful and forcible is essential to the proper appli-
cation of this section. State ex rel. R.J.Z., 736 
P.2d 235 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129. 
76-2-406. Force in defense of property. 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal 
property: 
(1) lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or 
(3) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-406, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-406. 
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